Diversified entities on the demand side pose a challenge to the credibility and security of the power system. In this study, a blockchain enhanced price incentive demand response (DR) is proposed for demand side management. The building users are as price anticipators, whose energy purchasing is a determinant factor for energy price. All building users can actively immigrate the shiftable electric loads into the valley time and cut down the cuttable thermal loads, as the response to the price scheme. Moreover, the information and energy interactions between building users are formulated as a non-cooperative game, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (NE) is proved. To avoid privacy leakage, each building user is assigned a pseud digital identity and all transactions are conducted by an anonymous operation. To guarantee the credibility of the optimal energy schedule, data verification is proposed to verify the truth of the data executed by each building user. The data maintained by all building users is transparent, traceable, and tamper-resistant. Finally, the empirical study shows that the proposed blockchain enhanced framework is effective for optimal energy scheduling, credibility, and security of the building user energy network. That is extremely significant for sustainable cities and society.

需求方的多元化实体对电力系统的信誉和安全性构成了挑战。在这项研究中，提出了一种用于需求方管理的区块链增强的价格激励需求响应（DR）。建筑用户是价格预期者，他们的能源购买是能源价格的决定因素。作为对价格方案的响应，所有建筑物用户都可以将可移动的电力负荷积极地转移到谷底时间，并削减可削减的热负荷。此外，建筑物用户之间的信息和能量交互被表述为非合作博弈，证明了纳什均衡（NE）的存在和唯一性。为避免隐私泄露，每个建筑物用户都被分配了一个伪数字身份，所有交易均由匿名操作进行。为了保证最佳能源计划的可信度，提出了数据验证来验证每个建筑用户执行的数据的真实性。所有建筑用户维护的数据都是透明的，可追溯的和防篡改的。最后，实证研究表明，提出的区块链增强框架对于建筑物用户能源网络的最佳能源调度，信誉和安全性是有效的。对于可持续的城市和社会而言，这是极为重要的。建筑用户能源网络的信誉和安全性。对于可持续的城市和社会而言，这是极为重要的。建筑用户能源网络的信誉和安全性。对于可持续的城市和社会而言，这是极为重要的。