ABSTRACT This paper addresses the important issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. It reviews alternate solutions: an essentially bilateral solution with the United States as an associated party, and a multilateral regime establishing a nuclear weapon free zone in a designated part of Northeast Asia which would include the militarily significant states in the region along with the NPT nuclear weapon states as associated parties. The effectiveness of a non-binding pledge versus a legally binding agreement and the possible availability of a nuclear assurance commitment itself – a non-binding declaration or a legally binding obligation – are analyzed. The verification requirements of a legally binding arrangement are outlined, and associated issues such as transit through the zone established by an agreed arrangement are considered. The political salience of the two types of solutions, bilateral and multilateral is commented upon: for example what has the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) indicated it would accept and the likelihood that the DPRK is now prepared to be, or can be, persuaded to make the hard decision to eliminate weapons and accede to the vast verification requirements of a legally binding regime; and whether the United States would be willing to provide a negative nuclear assurance of any sort in a bilateral non-binding agreement situation as well as the level of verification it might demand in a legally binding agreement.

中文翻译：

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减少朝鲜半岛的核危险：双边与多边方法

摘要本文论述了朝鲜半岛核武器的重要问题。它审查了其他解决方案：与美国为联系方的基本上是双边的解决方案，以及在东北亚指定地区建立无核武器区的多边政权，其中将包括该地区的军事上重要的国家以及《不扩散核武器条约》的核武器。武器国家为关联方。分析了不具约束力的认捐与具有法律约束力的协议的有效性，以及核保承诺本身（不具约束力的声明或具有法律约束力的义务）本身的可用性。概述了具有法律约束力的安排的验证要求，并考虑了相关问题，例如通过商定安排所建立的区域的中转。评论了双边和多边这两种解决方案的政治意义：例如，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国（DPRK）表示会接受什么，以及朝鲜现在准备成为或可能成为的可能性，劝说作出消灭武器的艰难决定，并同意具有法律约束力的制度的广泛核查要求；以及美国是否愿意在双边不具有约束力的协定情况下提供任何形式的负面核保证，以及美国可能会在具有法律约束力的协定中要求的核查水平。例如，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国（DPRK）表示将接受什么，以及朝鲜现在准备或有可能被说服做出艰难决定以消除武器并符合朝鲜的巨大核查要求的可能性。具有法律约束力的制度；以及美国是否愿意在双边不具有约束力的协定情况下提供任何形式的负面核保证，以及美国可能会在具有法律约束力的协定中要求的核查水平。例如，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国（DPRK）表示将接受什么，以及朝鲜现在准备或有可能被说服做出艰难决定以消除武器并符合朝鲜的巨大核查要求的可能性。具有法律约束力的制度；以及美国是否愿意在双边不具有约束力的协定情况下提供任何形式的负面核保证，以及美国可能会在具有法律约束力的协定中要求的核查水平。