In this paper we provide a philosophical analysis of the Hard Problem of consciousness and the implications of conceivability scenarios for current neuroscientific research. In particular, we focus on one of the most prominent neuroscientific theories of consciousness, integrated information theory (IIT). After a brief introduction on IIT, we present Chalmers’ original formulation and propose our own layered view of the hard problem, showing how 2 separate issues can be distinguished. More specifically, we argue that it’s possible to disentangle a core problem of consciousness from a layered hard problem, the latter being essentially connected to Chalmers’ conceivability argument. We then assess the relation between the Hard Problem and IIT, showing how the theory resists conceivability scenarios, and how it is equipped to face up to the hard problem in its broadest acceptation.

在本文中，我们对意识的难题进行了哲学分析，并提出了可想象的情景对当前神经科学研究的影响。特别是，我们专注于意识的最杰出的神经科学理论之一，综合信息理论（IIT）。在对IIT进行简要介绍之后，我们介绍了查尔默斯（Chalmers）的原始表述，并提出了我们自己对难题的分层视图，显示了如何区分两个独立的问题。更具体地说，我们认为有可能将意识的核心问题与分层的硬性问题区分开，后者与查尔默斯的可想象性论点本质上相关。然后，我们评估了“难题”和IIT之间的关系，展示了该理论如何抵御可能发生的情况，