Recent debates in philosophy of science have witnessed the rise of two major proposals. On the one hand, regarding the conceptual structure of scientific theories, some believe that they exhibit constitutive elements. The constitutive elements of a theory are the components that play the role of laying the foundations of empirical meaningfulness, and whose acceptance is prior to empirical research. On the other hand, as for the nature of scientific knowledge and its relation to nature, perspectival realism has pursued a middle ground in classic debates between realism and antirealism, by assuming that although knowledge is always situated both historically and culturally, scientific statements have truth values and constitute genuine claims about a mind-independent world. In this paper, I argue that these two lines of research are not only compatible but complement each other, and provide a common view of science. I contend that a theoretical perspective is a set of constitutive elements where models and representations may develop, and stress that both constitutivism and perspectivism have numerous shared characteristics, such as their vindication of the historicity of scientific knowledge, their recognition of human epistemic limits, and a very similar conception of truth.

最近在科学哲学中的辩论见证了两个主要提议的兴起。一方面，关于科学理论的概念结构，有人认为它们表现出构成要素。理论的构成要素是扮演为经验意义奠定基础的角色，其接受是在经验研究之前进行的。另一方面，关于科学知识的本质及其与自然的关系，透视性现实主义通过假设尽管知识总是在历史和文化上都存在，但在现实主义与反现实主义之间的经典辩论中却寻求中间立场。价值观，并构成有关独立于心灵的世界的真实主张。在本文中，我认为这两条研究线不仅相容而且相辅相成，并提供了科学的共同观点。我认为理论观点是模型和表示法可能发展的一组构成要素，并强调构成主义和透视主义具有许多共同的特征，例如他们对科学知识的历史性的辩护，对人类认识论极限的认识以及一个非常相似的真理概念