It is generally acknowledged by proponents of ‘new mechanism’ that mechanistic explanation involves adopting a perspective, but there is less agreement on how we should understand this perspective-taking or what its implications are (if any) for practising science. This paper examines the perspectival nature of mechanistic explanation through the lens of the ‘mechanistic stance’, which falls somewhere between Dennett’s more familiar physical and design stance. We argue this approach implies three distinct and significant ways in which mechanistic explanation can be interpreted as perspectival: ‘phenomenon perspectivism’, ‘pattern perspectivism’ and ‘hierarchy perspectivism’. We evaluate the strength of the perspective-dependency implied by each of these, and along the way, discuss their significance for wider debates within the new mechanism literature, such as the nature of function attribution and an ontic vs epistemic understanding of explanation.

“新机制”的支持者普遍承认，机械解释涉及采用一种观点，但是对于我们应该如何理解这种观点或它对实践科学的意义（如果有的话）的共识则较少。本文通过“机械立场”的角度考察了机械解释的透视性，“机械立场”介于丹尼特更熟悉的物理和设计立场之间。我们认为这种方法暗示了将机械解释解释为透视的三种截然不同的重要方式：“现象透视”，“模式透视”和“层次透视”。我们评估了每种方法所隐含的视角依赖性的强度，并一路走来，