Although the transfer of professors' inventions is typically performed by an intermediary set up by the university (the technology transfer office), other forms of transfer do coexist in reality. To clarify this situation and its consequences, we develop a model that endogenizes a professor's decision regarding the form of transfer for her invention in which intermediation by the transfer office is only one of two options, the other one being a transfer carried out by the professor herself. The intermediary can reach more potential licensees of the invention, whereas the professor is usually better at mitigating information asymmetry through signaling. In the semiseparating equilibrium of the game, promising technologies are likely to be cherry‐picked and transferred by the professor. This prediction that the transfer mode is influenced by invention quality is tested and confirmed, as are several other predictions, on our sample of 446 UK academic inventors. Specific care is taken to control for other mechanisms of IP assignment, such as those derived from consulting and sponsored research. Insights in terms of policy are drawn from this new perspective focusing on alternative transfer channels, match quality, and information asymmetry rather than on moral hazard.

中文翻译：

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TTO是一种选择，学术发明的转让和价值

尽管教授发明的转让通常是由大学（技术转让办公室）设立的中介机构进行的，但实际上其他形式的转让确实并存。为了弄清这种情况及其后果，我们开发了一个模型，该模型内生了一位教授关于其发明的转让形式的决定，在该决定中，转让办公室只是两种选择中的一种，另一种是由教授进行的转让她自己。中间人可以达到本发明的更多潜在被许可人，而教授通常更擅长通过信令减轻信息不对称。在游戏的半分离均衡中，教授可能会挑选并转让有前途的技术。与我们的其他一些预测一样，在我们的446名英国学术发明人的样本中，测试并证实了转移方式受发明质量影响的这一预测。要特别注意控制其他IP分配机制，例如那些来自咨询和赞助研究的机制。从这个新的角度对政策进行了洞察，重点是替代性的转移渠道，比赛质量和信息不对称，而不是道德风险。