This article presents a simple equilibrium model in which collateralized credit emerges endogenously. In a frictional world, where commitment is limited and agent's actions are not publicly observable, we show that collateral can serve as a credible device that prevents the participating parties from reneging. Our theory provides a microfoundation to justify the borrowing constraints that are widely used in the existing macroeconomic models. Using the model, we explain the payment puzzle. We also show that some assets are more suitable as collateral than others with different physical properties, for example, storable asset versus durable asset.

中文翻译：

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抵押品模型：内生化借款限制

本文提出了一个简单的均衡模型，其中抵押信贷是内生的。在一个摩擦性的世界中，承诺是有限的，代理人的行为是不可公开观察的，我们表明抵押品可以作为一种可靠的手段，防止参与方背信弃义。我们的理论为证明在现有宏观经济模型中广泛使用的借贷约束的合理性提供了微观基础。使用该模型，我们解释了支付难题。我们还表明，某些资产比其他具有不同物理属性的资产更适合作为抵押品，例如，可存储资产与耐用资产。