We model a decentralized, dynamic auction market platform in which a continuum of buyers and sellers participate in simultaneous, single-unit auctions each period. Our model accounts for the endogenous entry of agents and the impact of intertemporal optimization on bids. We estimate the structural primitives of our model using Kindle sales on eBay. We find that just over one-third of Kindle auctions on eBay result in an inefficient allocation with deadweight loss amounting to 14% of total possible market surplus. We also find that partial centralization—for example, running half as many 2-unit, uniform-price auctions each day—would eliminate a large fraction of the inefficiency, but yield lower seller revenues. Our results also highlight the importance of understanding platform composition effects—selection of agents into the market—in assessing the implications of market redesign. We also prove that the equilibrium of our model with a continuum of buyers and sellers is an approximate equilibrium of the analogous model with a finite number of agents.

中文翻译：

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分散拍卖平台的效率如何？

我们建立了一个分散的，动态的拍卖市场平台，在该平台中，每个时期都有连续的买方和卖方参加同时的单单位拍卖。我们的模型考虑了代理的内生性进入以及跨期优化对出价的影响。我们使用Kindle在eBay上的销售量来估算模型的结构原语。我们发现，在eBay上，仅三分之一以上的Kindle拍卖会导致分配效率低下，无谓损失达到潜在市场总盈余的14％。我们还发现，部分集中化（例如每天进行一半的2单位统一价格拍卖）可以消除很大一部分效率低下的情况，但会降低卖方​​的收入。我们的结果还强调了了解平台组成效应（选择代理商进入市场）在评估市场重新设计的重要性方面的重要性。我们还证明，具有连续的买卖双方的模型均衡是具有有限数量的主体的相似模型的近似均衡。