We find that contrary to popular belief, CEOs with long compensation duration do not make better long-term investment decisions. Using a comprehensive pay duration measure, we find that acquisitions conducted by CEOs with long compensation duration receive more negative announcement returns, and experience significantly worse post-acquisition abnormal operating and stock performance, compared with deals conducted by CEOs with short compensation duration. The negative correlation between compensation duration and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) performance is driven by long-term time-vesting plans, not by performance-vesting plans. The results suggest that extending CEO pay horizons without implementing performance requirements is insufficient to improve managerial long-term investment decisions.

中文翻译：

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高管薪酬期限的阴暗面：来自并购的证据

我们发现，与普遍看法相反，薪酬期限较长的 CEO 不会做出更好的长期投资决策。通过综合薪酬期限衡量，我们发现与薪酬期限较短的 CEO 进行的交易相比，薪酬期限较长的 CEO 进行的收购获得了更多的负公告回报，并且收购后的异常经营和股票表现明显更差。薪酬期限与并购 (M&A) 绩效之间的负相关是由长期时间归属计划驱动的，而不是由绩效归属计划驱动的。结果表明，在不实施绩效要求的情况下扩大 CEO 薪酬范围不足以改善管理层的长期投资决策。