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Singularity and consciousness: A neuropsychological contribution
Journal of Neuropsychology ( IF 2.0 ) Pub Date : 2021-02-01 , DOI: 10.1111/jnp.12234
Edward H F de Haan 1, 2 , Huibert Steven Scholte 1, 2 , Yair Pinto 1, 2 , Nicoletta Foschi 3 , Gabriele Polonara 4 , Mara Fabri 5
Affiliation  

In common sense experience based on introspection, consciousness is singular. There is only one ‘me’ and that is the one that is conscious. This means that ‘singularity’ is a defining aspect of ‘consciousness’. However, the three main theories of consciousness, Integrated Information, Global Workspace and Recurrent Processing theory, are generally not very clear on this issue. These theories have traditionally relied heavily on neuropsychological observations and have interpreted various disorders, such as anosognosia, neglect and split‐brain as impairments in conscious awareness without any reference to ‘the singularity’. In this review, we will re‐examine the theoretical implications of these impairments in conscious awareness and propose a new way how to conceptualize consciousness of singularity. We will argue that the subjective feeling of singularity can coexist with several disunified conscious experiences. Singularity awareness may only come into existence due to environmental response constraints. That is, perceptual, language, memory, attentional and motor processes may largely proceed unintegrated in parallel, whereas a sense of unity only arises when organisms need to respond coherently constrained by the affordances of the environment. Next, we examine from this perspective psychiatric disorders and psycho‐active drugs. Finally, we present a first attempt to test this hypothesis with a resting state imaging experiment in a split‐brain patient. The results suggest that there is substantial coherence of activation across the two hemispheres. These data show that a complete lesioning of the corpus callosum does not, in general, alter the resting state networks of the brain. Thus, we propose that we have separate systems in the brain that generate distributed conscious. The sense of singularity, the experience of a ‘Me‐ness’, emerges in the interaction between the world and response‐planning systems, and this leads to coherent activation in the different functional networks across the cortex.

中文翻译:

奇点与意识:神经心理学的贡献

在基于内省的常识经验中,意识是单一的。只有一个“我”,那就是有意识的那个。这意味着“奇点”是“意识”的一个决定性方面。然而,意识的三个主要理论,综合信息,全局工作空间和循环处理理论,在这个问题上普遍不是很清楚。这些理论传统上严重依赖于神经心理学的观察,并将各种疾病(例如失认症、忽视和脑裂)解释为意识意识障碍,而没有提及“奇点”。在这篇综述中,我们将重新审视这些意识障碍的理论含义,并提出一种如何概念化奇点意识的新方法。我们将争辩说,单一性的主观感觉可以与几种不统一的意识体验共存。奇点意识可能只因环境而存在回复约束。也就是说,知觉、语言、记忆、注意和运动过程可能在很大程度上并行进行,但只有当生物体需要受到环境可供性限制的连贯反应时,才会出现统一感。接下来,我们从这个角度研究精神障碍和精神活性药物。最后,我们首次尝试用裂脑患者的静息状态成像实验来检验这一假设。结果表明,两个半球的激活具有显着的一致性。这些数据表明,胼胝体的完全损伤通常不会改变大脑的静息状态网络。因此,我们建议我们在大脑中有独立的系统来产生分布式意识。奇异感,“我性”的体验,
更新日期:2021-03-26
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