Banks face liquidity and capital pressures that favor selling off the loans they originate, but loan sales undermine their monitoring incentives. A bank’s loan default history is a noisy measure of its past monitoring choices, which can serve as a reputation mechanism to incentivize current monitoring. In equilibrium, higher reputation banks monitor (weakly) more intensively; if retention is credible, they generally retain less of the loans they originate. Monitoring is difficult to sustain in periods with uncommonly large spikes in loan demand (“booms”), especially for low-reputation banks, which are more likely to accommodate boom demand and forgo monitoring.

中文翻译：

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发起到分销贷款的监控：游戏中的声誉与皮肤

银行面临流动性和资本压力，有利于出售其发放的贷款，但出售贷款破坏了它们的监控动机。银行的贷款违约历史是对其过去监控选择的一个嘈杂的衡量标准，它可以作为一种声誉机制来激励当前的监控。在均衡状态下，声誉较高的银行监控（较弱）更密集；如果保留是可信的，他们通常会保留较少的贷款。在贷款需求异常大幅飙升（“繁荣”）的时期，监测难以维持，特别是对于声誉较低的银行，它们更有可能适应繁荣需求并放弃监测。