In the past decade, subsidy policies aimed at demand-side of photovoltaic (PV) supply chains have created a dilemma. While they foster the growth of the PV industry, they also induce overcapacity problems to the society. As a result, many governments have cut back subsidies to PV system users. These subsidy reductions hurt PV enterprises and their supply chains that are now facing lost business. To rescue enterprises, but not the market, an appropriate supply-side oriented subsidy policy is urgently needed. It is also important that different stakeholders on a PV supply chain develop closer collaborations to enhance their competitiveness against their rival PV supply chains. In this paper, we use game-theoretical models to investigate the impact of this new approach to policy design within the PV industry. Our findings suggest that the government should properly control the PV market entry, implement a balanced subsidy program and encourage a healthy competition among multiple PV supply chains to balance the operational performance of PV supply chains and the effects of government subsidy on the improvement of market out and social welfare. Under such a governance and subsidy program, a moderate combination of operational strategies will be the robust strategic response for multiple PV supply chains in a competitive environment.

在过去的十年中，针对光伏（PV）供应链需求侧的补贴政策造成了两难选择。它们在促进光伏产业发展的同时，也给社会带来了产能过剩的问题。结果，许多政府削减了对光伏系统用户的补贴。这些补贴的减少伤害了目前正面临业务损失的光伏企业及其供应链。为了营救企业而不是市场，急需采取适当的以供应方为导向的补贴政策。同样重要的是，光伏供应链上的不同利益相关者应建立更紧密的合作关系，以增强其相对于竞争对手光伏供应链的竞争力。在本文中，我们使用博弈论模型来研究这种新方法对光伏行业政策设计的影响。我们的研究结果表明，政府应适当控制光伏市场准入，实施平衡的补贴计划，并鼓励多个光伏供应链之间进行良性竞争，以平衡光伏供应链的运营绩效和政府补贴对改善市场环境的影响。和社会福利。在这样的治理和补贴计划下，运营策略的适当组合将是竞争环境中多个光伏供应链的强有力的战略响应。