Abstract This study investigates the peer effect in the initial recognition of goodwill. We find that firms imitate their peers in the initial recognition of goodwill. The higher the tendency for imitation, the higher the proportion of goodwill recognized. Imitation behavior in the initial recognition of goodwill cannot be explained by information acquisition or rivalry motivations. Instead, we find evidence that managers’ opportunistic motivations explain the peer effect in the initial recognition of goodwill and the overestimation of goodwill arising from imitation tendencies. Executive overconfidence weakens the peer effect but exacerbates the overestimation of goodwill caused by imitation tendencies. Finally, the higher the imitation tendency, the greater the probability and amount of goodwill impairment in the future. This further confirms that the peer effect leads to overestimation of goodwill. The findings of this study enrich the literature on goodwill and provide insightful empirical evidence for regulating goodwill accounting. The results show that the conservatism principle should be reinforced in the initial recognition of goodwill.

中文翻译：

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初始确认商誉中的同伴效应

摘要本研究探讨商誉初始确认中的同伴效应。我们发现，公司在最初认可商誉时就模仿了同行。模仿的趋势越高，商誉的比例就越高。最初对商誉的模仿行为不能通过信息获取或竞争动机来解释。取而代之的是，我们发现有证据表明，经理人的机会主义动机可以解释对商誉的初始确认中的同伴效应，以及由模仿倾向引起的对商誉的高估。行政人员的过度自信削弱了同伴效应，但加剧了因模仿倾向而导致的对商誉的高估。最后，模仿趋势越高，未来商誉减损的可能性和金额就越大。这进一步证实了同伴效应导致对商誉的高估。这项研究的发现丰富了有关商誉的文献，并为规范商誉会计提供了有见地的经验证据。结果表明，在最初确认善意时应加强保守主义原则。