When Carl Wellman (1971) introduced the reasoning-type conduction, he endorsed a dialectical view on natural language argumentation. Contemporary scholarship, by contrast, treats conductive argument predominantly on a product view. Not only did Wellman’s reasons for a dialectical view thus fall into disregard; a product-treatment of conduction also flouts the standard semantics of ‘argument’. Attempting to resolve these difficulties, our paper traces Wellman’s preference for a dialectical view to the role of defeasible warrants. These act as stand-ins for (parts of) value hierarchies that arguers of normal suasory inclination find acceptable. We also improve on extant ways of diagramming conduction and distinguish two of its structural variants.

中文翻译：

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关于行为的辩证观：理由、保证和正常的诱惑倾向

当 Carl Wellman (1971) 引入推理型传导时，他赞同自然语言论证的辩证观点。相比之下，当代学术主要从产品的角度来处理传导性论证。因此，不仅韦尔曼的辩证观点理由被忽视了；对传导的产品处理也无视“论证”的标准语义。试图解决这些困难，我们的论文追溯了威尔曼对可废止权证作用的辩证观点的偏好。这些作为（部分）价值等级的替代品，正常的讨好倾向的争论者认为可以接受。我们还改进了现有的绘制传导图的方法，并区分了它的两种结构变体。