Scientific realism is usually presented as if metaphysical realism (i.e. the thesis that there is a structured mind-independent external world) were one of its essential parts. This paper aims to examine how weak the metaphysical commitments endorsed by scientific realists could be. I will argue that scientific realism could be stated without accepting any form of metaphysical realism. Such a conclusion does not go as far as to try to combine scientific realism with metaphysical antirealism. Instead, it amounts to the combination of the former with a weaker view, called quietism, which is agnostic on the existence of mind-independent structures. In Sect. 2, I will argue that the minimal claim that brings together every scientific realist view is devoid of any metaphysical commitment. In Sect. 3, I will define metaphysical realism and antirealism. Such work will be instrumental in providing a more precise statement of quietism. Finally (Sect. 4), I will argue that assuming quietism, it is still possible to make sense of the debate between scientific realists and antirealists.

科学实在论通常被描述为好像形而上学实在论（即存在一个结构化的独立于心灵的外部世界的论点）是其重要组成部分之一。本文旨在检验科学实在论者认可的形而上学承诺有多薄弱。我将争辩说，可以在不接受任何形式的形而上学实在论的情况下陈述科学实在论。这样的结论并没有达到试图将科学实在论与形而上学的反实在论结合起来的地步。相反，它相当于前者与一种较弱的观点的结合，称为安静主义，这种观点对独立于思想的结构的存在是不可知论的。昆虫。2，我将争辩说，汇集了所有科学现实主义观点的最低要求没有任何形而上学的承诺。昆虫。3、我将定义形而上学实在论和反实在论。这样的工作将有助于提供更准确的无为主义陈述。最后（第 4 节），我将论证假设无为主义，仍然有可能理解科学实在论者和反实在论者之间的争论。