ABSTRACT

Over recent years, Russia’s government has been expanding its presence in domestic state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and instituting numerous regulatory revisions. However, research is inconclusive over the government’s underlying economic intentions, and intervention outcomes, vis-à-vis SOEs. Likewise, it remains imprecise in relation to various characteristics of government–SOE interaction. To mitigate these issues, this paper develops a new state predation model relevant to large Russian SOEs. It argues, using the NOC (national oil company) mid-management recruitment and selection case, that SOEs are being re-oriented into centers of active regime support. Accordingly, the Russian government is prioritizing the placement of loyal clients, into NOC structures, who advance the SOEs’ growing political obligations. It is also rewarding them, in a performance-curbing manner, through tolerating their inadequate economic competence and heightened engagement in corporate corruption. At the same time, non-clients, including top international talent, are experiencing diminishing recruitment numbers and opportunities. This status quo, then, is being maintained via informal (closed and procedure-less) practices, though certain formal rules support it too. Consequently, the above-outlined state predation insights are important to understanding SOE political over-embeddedness and patron–client relations in emerging market SOEs.

摘要

近年来，俄罗斯政府一直在扩大其在国内国有企业（SOE）中的存在，并制定了许多监管法规。但是，相对于国有企业而言，关于政府的基本经济意图和干预效果的研究尚无定论。同样，关于政府与国有企业互动的各种特征，它仍然是不精确的。为了缓解这些问题，本文开发了一种与俄罗斯大型国有企业有关的新的国家掠夺模型。它使用国家石油公司（NOC）的中层管理人员招聘和selection选案例认为，国有企业正在重新定位为积极的政权支持中心。因此，俄罗斯政府优先考虑将忠诚客户置于NOC结构中，这将推动国有企业日益增长的政治义务。这也是对他们的奖励，通过容忍他们的经济能力不足和加大对公司腐败的参与，以绩效遏制的方式进行。同时，包括国际顶尖人才在内的非客户正经历着越来越少的招聘人数和机会。这样，尽管某些正式规则也支持这种现状，但仍通过非正式（封闭式和无规程）实践来维持这种现状。因此，上述概述的国家掠夺见解对于理解新兴市场国有企业中的国有企业政治过度嵌入和顾客与客户之间的关系非常重要。这样，尽管某些正式规则也支持这种现状，但仍通过非正式（封闭式和无规程）实践来维持这种现状。因此，上述概述的国家掠夺见解对于理解新兴市场国有企业中的国有企业政治过度嵌入和顾客与客户之间的关系非常重要。这样，尽管某些正式规则也支持这种现状，但仍通过非正式（封闭式和无规程）实践来维持这种现状。因此，上述概述的国家掠夺见解对于理解新兴市场国有企业中的国有企业政治过度嵌入和顾客与客户之间的关系非常重要。