This article studies a sequential search model in which consumers can purchase a product without incurring a search cost to inspect the match value, which we call “blind buying”. We show that the optimal search policy is no longer as per Weitzman (1979). When the match value has a symmetric distribution, both consumers and firms are indifferent to the search order, conditional on that blind buying does not take place in the first stage. Blind buying always increases total welfare, and increases market prices and industrial profits if and only if the first-sample search cost is below a threshold value. An increase in the search cost reduces equilibrium prices. Such a result is consistent with existing price-directed search models, but the underlying mechanisms are different. We also show that being prominent can adversely affect a firm if the match value is asymmetrically distributed, which contrasts the literature.

本文研究了一种顺序搜索模型，在这种模型中，消费者可以购买产品而不会产生检查匹配值的搜索成本，我们称之为“盲目购买”。我们表明，最佳搜索策略不再像Weitzman（1979）所述。当匹配值具有对称分布时，消费者和企业都对搜索顺序无动于衷，条件是第一阶段不会盲目购买。且仅当第一样本搜索成本低于阈值时，盲目购买总会增加总福利，并增加市场价格和行业利润。搜索成本的增加会降低均衡价格。这样的结果与现有的价格导向的搜索模型是一致的，但是潜在的机制是不同的。