Institutional bricolage continues to attract scientific and policy interest, especially in appreciating natural resource management outcomes. However, contemporary bricolage processes in forest-abundant countries where state rules interact with customary rules that have been, at least, partially shaped by different colonial agents, remain relatively less explored. This intriguing setting relates to Cameroon, where growing inefficiency in forest use has often been connected to colonial hangover. Using document analysis, key informant interviews (45) and focus group discussions (4) from 8 communities around the Bakossi and Santchou protected areas in Cameroon – shaped respectively by British and French colonial influences respectively, this paper sheds light on the colonial undertone in customary and state institutional provisions, and explores bricolage manifestations in timber and non-timber forest products (NTFPs) subsectors. The paper also discusses alliances of convenience created, their outcomes and policy implications. Through narratives and thematic analysis, the paper reveals differentiated bricolage manifestations. While actors in Bakossi justify NTFPs harvesting on their customs, those in Santchou draw from state laws to exploit and commercialize NTFPs. Timber exploiters draw upon state and customary rules to harvest and commercialize timber, in the guise of exploitation for community service. While traditional rulers in Bakossi affirm their authority in regulating timber exploitation, those of Santchou depend on alliances with conservators to assert authority. State and community actors exploit the unspecified home consumption quota for NTFPs, to exploit and commercialize NTFPs. The results provide new insights in appreciating the complexity with regards to the relative influence of customary and state rules, and forest use practices in former British and French colonies. This paper suggests that Cameroon's forest policy revision should clarify the exploitation quota for timber and NTFPs, for community service provision and home consumption respectively. Furthermore, clarifying applicable customary rules and ratifying them at district level is imperative to check against powerful bricoleurs.

机构贿赂继续引起科学和政策兴趣，特别是在赞赏自然资源管理成果方面。然而，相对而言，在森林丰裕的国家中，国家规则与至少部分地由不同殖民者塑造的习惯规则相互影响的当代贿赂过程仍然相对较少被探索。这种有趣的环境与喀麦隆有关，喀麦隆的森林利用效率低下常常与殖民地宿醉联系在一起。利用文件分析，喀麦隆Bakossi和Santchou保护区周围8个社区的关键知情人访谈（45）和焦点小组讨论（4），分别受英国和法国殖民地的影响，本文揭示了习惯上的殖民地色彩以及国家机构规定，并探讨木材和非木材林产品（NTFPs）子行业中的贿赂现象。本文还讨论了创建便利联盟，其结果和政策含义。通过叙述和主题分析，本文揭示了差异化的Bricolage表现形式。巴科西（Bakossi）的行动者为NTFP的习俗辩护是合理的，而Santchou的行动者则借鉴了州法律对NTFP进行开发和商业化。木材开发者以开采为幌子为社区服务，利用州和习惯规则进行木材采伐和商业化。巴科西的传统统治者重申了他们对木材开发的管制权，而桑乔的统治者则依靠与保护者的联盟来确立权威。州和社区参与者利用NTFP的未指定房屋消费配额，开发和商业化NTFP。结果为了解习惯和国家法规的相对影响以及前英法殖民地的森林使用实践提供了新的见解。本文建议喀麦隆的森林政策修订版应明确木材和非木材林产品的开发配额，分别用于社区服务提供和家庭消费。此外，必须澄清适用的习惯规则并在地区一级批准它们，以制止强大的 森林政策修订应明确木材和非木材林产品的开发配额，分别用于社区服务提供和家庭消费。此外，必须澄清适用的习惯规则并在地区一级批准它们，以制止强大的 森林政策修订应明确木材和非木材林产品的开发配额，分别用于社区服务提供和家庭消费。此外，必须澄清适用的习惯规则并在地区一级批准它们，以制止强大的贿赂者。