Ciphertext-policy attribute-based searchable encryption (CP-ABSE) is widely used in the cloud environment to provide data privacy and fine-grained access control over encrypted data. The existing CP-ABSE schemes are designed based on bilinear pairing hardness assumptions to prove their security. However, these schemes are vulnerable to quantum attacks, i.e., adversaries can break the security of these schemes with the use of quantum computers. To address this issue, in this paper, we propose a novel ciphertext-policy attribute-based searchable encryption from lattice (CP-ABSEL) in cloud storage, since lattice-based cryptography is quantum attacks free. In CP-ABSEL, we adopted learning with errors (LWE) hardness assumption to resist from quantum attacks. Further, CP-ABSEL is indistinguishable against the chosen keyword attack and indistinguishable against chosen plaintext attack. Moreover, CP-ABSEL allows only legitimate users to perform a keyword search over an encrypted index, and unauthorized users cannot get even the ciphertext form of documents. The performance analysis proves that CP-ABSEL is efficient and practical.

基于加密文本策略属性的可搜索加密（CP-ABSE）在云环境中被广泛使用，以提供数据隐私和对加密数据的细粒度访问控制。现有的CP-ABSE方案基于双线性配对硬度假设进行设计，以证明其安全性。但是，这些方案容易受到量子攻击，即，对手可以通过使用量子计算机来破坏这些方案的安全性。为了解决这个问题，在本文中，由于基于格的密码学没有量子攻击，因此我们提出了一种新颖的基于密文策略的基于属性的可从格中搜索的加密算法（CP-ABSEL）。在CP-ABSEL中，我们采用具有误差的学习（LWE）硬度假设来抵御量子攻击。进一步，CP-ABSEL与选择的关键字攻击没有区别，而与选择的纯文本攻击则没有区别。此外，CP-ABSEL仅允许合法用户对加密索引执行关键字搜索，未经授权的用户甚至无法获得文档的密文形式。性能分析证明CP-ABSEL是高效实用的。