Market mechanisms for land assembly problems suffer from a holdout problem and coercive legal solutions like eminent domain introduce new inefficiencies. A new mechanism that is not fully market-based but attempts price discovery is proposed, experimentally studied and is shown to improve efficiency. The mechanism is fully specified by two parameters - a percentile value of the empirical distribution of ask-prices that serves as a trading threshold for the buyer and a quantum of penalty to be applied to landowners who bid relatively very high. In a 2 $\times$ 2 treatment, it is found that reducing the trading threshold and increasing the penalty improves the efficiency performance.

土地集会问题的市场机制遭受了拖延问题的困扰，强制性法律解决方案（如知名领域）带来了新的效率低下的问题。提出了一种新的机制，该机制并非完全基于市场，而是尝试发现价格，并进行了实验研究，结果表明可以提高效率。该机制由两个参数完全指定：要价的经验分布的百分位数值（作为买方的交易阈值）和要价相对较高的地主的罚款量。在2$\times$ 在图2的处理中，发现降低交易阈值并增加惩罚可以改善效率性能。