Using a sample from 38 economies, we examine the relation between bank regulators’ supervisory power and loan spreads. We find that loans issued by banks in economies with more powerful supervisors have higher spreads. The positive association is more pronounced when firms have lower credit quality, when the relationships between firms and banks are less established, when syndicate loans involve fewer lenders, and when lead banks have a riskier profile. Further analyses reveal that loans issued by banks that operate under more powerful supervisors have smaller size and shorter maturity, and the loans are more likely to have collateral requirements and restrictive covenants. Overall, these results suggest that stronger supervisory power of bank regulators affects loan contracting by mitigating lenders’ excessive risk taking.

我们使用来自38个经济体的样本，研究了银行监管机构的监管权与贷款利差之间的关系。我们发现，由具有更强大监管机构的经济体中的银行发行的贷款具有较高的利差。当企业的信用质量较低，企业与银行之间的关系不那么牢固，银团贷款涉及的放款人较少以及牵头银行的风险较高时，这种正向关联会更加明显。进一步的分析表明，由在更强大的监管机构下运作的银行发行的贷款规模较小且期限较短，并且这些贷款更有可能具有抵押要求和限制性契约。总体而言，这些结果表明，银行监管机构较强的监管能力通过减轻放贷人的过度冒险行为来影响贷款承包。