ABSTRACT

Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson have argued that to evaluate the funniness of a joke based on the consideration of whether it is morally appropriate to feel amused commits the “moralistic fallacy.” We offer a new and empirically informed reply. We argue that there is a way to take morality into consideration without committing this fallacy, that is, it is legitimate to say that for some people, witty but immoral jokes can fail to be funny because they are immoral. In our account, one has an intramural moral reason not to feel amused if one focuses on the moral feature itself of a joke rather than the moral consequence implied in one’s reaction to the joke. When one judges a joke as not funny because of the intramural moral reason, one is in a negative emotional state with high arousal, for example, moral disgust or anger. This state is psychologically incompatible with amusement. That one has an intramural reason not to feel amused thus implies that one does not have a reason to feel amused. Moral consideration thus plays an indirect and appropriate role in the evaluation of the funniness of a joke.

抽象的

贾斯汀·达姆斯（Justin D'Arms）和丹尼尔·雅各布森（Daniel Jacobson）认为，在考虑笑话是否在道德上适当的情况下，对玩笑的趣味性进行评估是“道德谬论”。我们提供了一个新的经验丰富的答复。我们认为，有一种方法可以在不犯这种谬论的情况下将道德考虑在内，也就是说，可以说对于某些人而言，机智但不道德的笑话可能因为不道德而变得不好笑。在我们看来，如果人们只关注笑话本身的道德特征而不是对笑话的反应所暗示的道德后果，那么就有一个不让自己感到开心的壁上道德理由。当一个人因为壁上的道德原因而把一个笑话判定为不好笑时，就处于一种情绪低落的状态，引起了强烈的唤醒，例如道德上的厌恶或愤怒。这种状态在心理上与娱乐是格格不入的。人有不被逗乐的壁内原因，因此意味着人没有被逗乐的理由。因此，道德考量在笑话的评价中起着间接和适当的作用。