1 INTRODUCTION

Anna Stilz's Territorial Sovereignty covers an impressively wide terrain, from the state's right to rule over territory to the right to secede, from cultural neutrality to equitable access to natural resources, from collective self‐determination to cooperation with international institutions, from coercive to noncoercive responses to the commission of injustice.

In this paper, I examine Stilz's account and defense of territorial sovereignty in the light of the view that there are landmarks (monuments, geological structures, and landscapes) which are located in and subject to the jurisdiction of sovereign states, but which are deemed to be of outstanding value to humankind as a whole, irrespective of whatever economic value they might have. Put differently, I am interested in bringing Stilz's account to bear on the notion of humankind's common heritage.

I stress “heritage,” for quite often, humankind is said to own global systemic systems such as transboundary rivers and forests, species, unoccupied areas of the earth such as Antarctica and the oceans, whose value partly reside in the fact that they contain extractable natural resources. The question of who, if anyone, has rights over natural resources with extractive value is attracting growing interest in the contemporary political philosophy of territory, justice, and natural resources.¹

By “heritage,” however, I have in mind something else: I mean that which we inherit from our ancestors, which we value here and now and which we seek to transmit to our successors for reasons which have nothing to do with its extractive value. The question of who, if anyone, has rights over humankind's common heritage thus understood is largely neglected. To the extent that contemporary moral and political philosophy addresses interests outsiders might have in the state's decisions regarding its territory, it focuses on would‐be migrants (who have an interest in establishing residence on that territory) or on those individuals who are affected by the state's decisions with respect to its natural resources. It does not consider interests they might have in those landmarks which there are independent reasons to believe (more on which below) are part of humankind's common heritage.

This particular question—the value of, and our duties toward, humankind's common heritage—suffers from serious neglect in moral and political philosophy. If only for this reason, it is worth examining in its own right: that is one of my aims here. (I offer a fuller treatment in Fabre 2021.) My other aim is to show what a singularly sophisticated and illuminating defense of territorial rights might tell us about it.

At first glance, the signs are not particularly promising. Indeed, it might seem that Stilz's account has little to say about humankind's common heritage. On her view, the territorial state both instantiates and is justified by appeal to the core values of occupancy, basic justice and collective self‐determination. Yet, outsiders do not (in the case at hand) seek to occupy the territory on which those landmarks are located; it is not clear that their basic rights are undermined by the state's failure to preserve those landmarks; and it is clear that to confer on them decisional rights over the latter would impair the state's, or, rather, its citizens’, right to collective self‐determination.

As we shall see, however, with a bit of reconstruction, one can extract from Territorial Sovereignty an interesting set of claims about humankind's common heritage. In Section 2, I provide a brief sketch and defense of that notion. In Section 3, I show that Stilz does not have the argumentative resources to make the state's right to rule over its territory conditional upon its common heritage‐based decisions, but that she can nevertheless support the weaker claim that those decisions are subject to evaluation at the bar of justice. Section 5 concludes.

Two final words. First, in this paper, I restrict myself to immoveable landmarks. Moveable objects, such as paintings, musical scores, artifacts, archives, etc., raise specific questions that I cannot hope to tackle here, notably with respect to repatriation and bans on their exportation.

Second, papers on someone else's work, particularly when written for symposia, tend to fall into two categories: either they articulate deep disagreements with the author and seek to show where and why he or she has got it wrong; or (in far fewer cases) they seek to bring the author's account to bear, sympathetically, on issues which the latter has not fully addressed. This paper falls firmly within the second category. As we shall see at various junctures, there is much here with which (I think) Stilz will agree. I learned at least as much from her defense of territorial sovereignty by thinking about those cases as I did by rehearsing (in my mind) my objections to it—hence my focus here.

中文翻译：

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领土主权和人类共同遗产☆

1引言

安娜·斯蒂尔兹（Anna Stilz）的领土主权涵盖了令人印象深刻的广阔领域，从国家对领土的统治权到割裂权，从文化中立到公平获取自然资源，从集体自决到与国际机构的合作，从强制性到非强制性造成不公正待遇。

在本文中，我考虑到有一些地标（纪念碑，地质结构和地貌）位于主权国家的管辖范围内，并受其管辖，认为斯蒂尔兹对领土主权的论述和捍卫领土主权不论其具有何种经济价值，对整个人类都具有非凡的价值。换句话说，我有兴趣将斯蒂尔兹的论述运用到人类共同遗产的概念上。

我强调“遗产”，在很多情况下，人类被称为拥有全球性系统性系统，例如跨界河流和森林，物种，地球上诸如南极洲等未被占用的地区和海洋，它们的价值部分在于它们含有可提取物的事实。自然资源。谁拥有对具有开采价值的自然资源拥有权利的问题正在引起人们对当代关于领土，正义和自然资源的政治哲学的越来越多的关注。^1个

但是，通过“遗产”，我还有其他想法：我的意思是我们从祖先那里继承下来的东西，我们在这里和现在都重视，并且由于与它的提取价值无关的原因而试图传递给我们的继任者。如此被理解的人（如果有的话）拥有对人类共同遗产的权利的问题在很大程度上被忽略了。在某种程度上讲当代道德和政治哲学解决了外人在国家关于其领土的决定中可能具有的利益时，它集中于可能的移民（对在该领土上建立住所感兴趣的移民）或受移民影响的个人。国家对其自然资源的决定。

这个特殊的问题-人类共同遗产的价值和我们对人类共同遗产的责任-受到道德和政治哲学的严重忽视。仅仅是出于这个原因，就其本身而言，值得研究：这是我在这里的目标之一。（我将在《法布尔2021》中提供更充分的待遇。）我的另一个目的是展示对领土权的单方面复杂和富有启发性的辩护可能会告诉我们什么。

乍一看，这些迹象并不是特别有希望。确实，似乎斯蒂尔兹的叙述几乎没有关于人类共同遗产的说法。在她看来，领土国家既可以实例化，又可以通过诉诸占领，基本正义和集体自决等核心价值而得到辩护。但是，局外人不会（在眼前的情况下）试图占领这些地标所在的领土；尚不清楚该州未能保护这些地标而损害了他们的基本权利；很明显，赋予他们对后者的决定权将损害国家（或更确切地说是其公民）的集体自决权。

但是，正如我们将看到的，只需进行一些重构，就可以从领土主权中提取出一系列有趣的关于人类共同遗产的主张。在第2节中，我简要概述了该概念。在第3节中，我表明Stilz没有论据性资源来使国家以其基于传统遗产的决定为条件来统治其领土的权利，但是她仍然可以支持较弱的主张，即这些决定需要接受评估。司法标准。第五节总结。

最后两个词。首先，在本文中，我将自己限制在不可移动的地标上。可移动的物体，例如绘画，乐谱，文物，档案等，提出了我在这里无法解决的特定问题，特别是在遣返和禁止其出口方面。

其次，关于他人工作的论文，特别是在为研讨会撰写的论文时，往往分为两类：要么阐明与作者的深层分歧，然后寻求表明他或她弄错了什么地方和原因。或者（在极少数情况下）他们试图同情地对待提交人的账目，而后者还没有完全解决这些问题。本文完全属于第二类。正如我们将在各个关头看到的那样，（我认为）斯蒂尔将在这里达成很多共识。通过思考这些案件，我至少从她对领土主权的捍卫中学到了很多东西，就像我通过排练（在我心中）对它的反对那样-因此，我将重点放在这里。