We study the determinants of convergence to efficient conventions in coordination games played on networks, when agents focus on past performance (imitative play). Previous theoretical results provide an incomplete picture and suggest potentially-complex interactions between the features of dynamics and behavior. We conducted an extensive simulation study (with approximately 1.12 million simulations) varying network size, interaction and information radius, the probability of actual interaction, the probability of mistakes, tie-breaking rules, and the process governing revision opportunities. Our main result is that “more interactions,” be it in the form of larger interaction neighborhoods or of a higher interaction probability, lead to less coordination on efficient conventions. A second observation, confirming previous but partial theoretical results, is that a large network size relative to the size of neighborhoods (a “large world”) facilitates convergence to efficient conventions. Third, a larger information neighborhood helps efficiency because it increases visibility of efficient payoffs across the network. Last, technical details of the dynamic specification as tie-breaking or inertia, while often relevant for specific theoretical results, appear to be of little empirical relevance in the larger space of dynamics.

当代理商专注于过去的表现（模拟游戏）时，我们研究了在网络上进行的协调游戏中收敛到有效约定的决定因素。先前的理论结果提供了不完整的图片，并提出了动力学和行为特征之间潜在复杂的相互作用。我们进行了广泛的模拟研究（约有112万模拟），改变了网络规模，交互作用和信息半径，实际交互作用的可能性，错误的可能性，打破平局的规则以及控制修订机会的过程。我们的主要结果是，“更多的交互”（以较大的交互邻域形式或较高的交互概率形式出现）会导致在有效约定上的协调性降低。第二个观察，相对于邻里的大小（“大世界”），有助于融合成高效的公约。第三，较大的信息邻域有助于提高效率，因为它可以提高整个网络上有效收益的可见性。最后，动态规格的技术细节（如抢七或惯性）通常与特定的理论结果有关，但在较大的动力学空间中似乎与经验无关。