Why do some foreign ministers stay longer in office than others? Are they punished when the country loses a war? Several scholars have focused on the tenure of leaders as an important predictor of foreign policy outcomes, such as war onset, creating an interest in leadership survival. We here shift the focus to the survival of other important politicians in cabinet—foreign ministers, hypothesizing that their tenure depends on their performance in office. For example, we expect that foreign ministers stay longer in office when the country experiences an armed conflict resulting in a win or in a compromise agreement. We evaluate and find support for several of our hypotheses using an original historical dataset, which comprises all foreign ministers of the world's thirteen great powers from the early modern period to the present, covering about 1,100 foreign minister-terms of office.

中文翻译：

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战争、表演和外长的生存

为什么有些外长的任期比其他外长长？当国家输掉战争时，他们会受到惩罚吗？一些学者将领导人的任期视为外交政策结果的重要预测因素，例如战争爆发，从而对领导层的生存产生了兴趣。我们在这里将焦点转移到内阁中其他重要政治人物——外交部长的生死存亡上，假设他们的任期取决于他们在办公室的表现。例如，我们预计当该国经历导致胜利或妥协协议的武装冲突时，外交部长的任期会更长。我们使用原始历史数据集对我们的几个假设进行评估并找到支持，该数据集包括从近代早期到现在的世界 13 个大国的所有外交部长，