Abstract

Previous research contends that economic sanctions must benefit opposition groups relative to the incumbent regime in order to generate policy change. However, studies have found that sanctions often backfire and increase regime support. While this rally-around-the-flag effect is well known, it is currently unclear how senders can prevent it. In this article, I use individual-level data from a targeted state to examine whether a sender's framing of the sanctions may play a role in preventing the rally-around-the-flag effect. A survey experiment conducted among respondents in Venezuela demonstrates that the public attitude toward sanctions is shaped by the framing of the sanctions. Specifically, people adopt more favorable views when interpreting sanctions as targeted measures against regime members with the explicit goal of protecting fundamental human rights. The effects are evident among moderates, which is significant as they are otherwise the group most likely to rally behind the regime.

中文翻译：

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用经济制裁赢得人心？委内瑞拉调查实验的证据

摘要

先前的研究认为，经济制裁必须使反对派相对于现任政权受益，以便产生政策变化。但是，研究发现，制裁往往适得其反，并增加了政权的支持。尽管众所周知，这种“环环相扣”效应，但是目前尚不清楚发件人如何防止这种情况。在本文中，我使用来自目标状态的个人级别数据来检查发件人对制裁的构架是否可能在防止举报反弹效应中发挥作用。在委内瑞拉受访者中进行的一项调查实验表明，公众对制裁的态度是由制裁的框架决定的。特别，人们将制裁解释为针对政权成员的有针对性的措施时，采取了更有利的观点，其明确目标是保护基本人权。这种影响在温和派中间很明显，这是很重要的，因为否则他们是最有可能在政权后面集会的群体。