ABSTRACT

Customary international law has governed high seas piracy for many centuries and is now codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC). In this article, we discuss the reasons why enforcement against piracy today is less effective than three hundred years ago. We contend that crime, including the crime of piracy, can be modeled as a rational choice that is responsive to expected rewards and punishments. Based on this view, we argue that three hundred years ago, the free rider problem resulting from enforcement on the high seas was less prevalent than it is today because seaborne trade was more concentrated in the vessels of a few countries, making enforcement more like internal than international policing. The persistence of piracy today also stems from a continuing low probability of capture coupled with lenient punishments. In addition to enforcement differences, we contrast the sources of piracy in the two eras—in the earlier period, the end of privateering led many privateers to engage in piracy, whereas today, the main source of pirates in the Western Indian Ocean is the existence of a “failed state,” and off West Africa and South East Asia pirates are common criminals.

摘要

习惯国际法控制公海海盗活动已有数百年历史，现已编入《联合国海洋法公约》（LOSC）。在本文中，我们讨论了如今的反盗版执法不及三百年前有效的原因。我们认为，可以将包括海盗犯罪在内的犯罪建模为对预期的报酬和惩罚作出反应的理性选择。基于这种观点，我们认为，三百年前，由于公海贸易更多地集中在少数国家的船只上，因此在公海执法导致的搭便车问题不像今天那样普遍。而不是国际警务。如今，盗版行为的持续存在还源于持续的低捕获率和宽大的惩罚。除了执法方面的差异外，我们还对比了两个时代的盗版来源-在早期，