Abstract

The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies for rationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophers argue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence of an emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present review reveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidence that emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger, sympathy, and guilt indicates that people only reliably experience emotions when judging conduct that is relevant to the welfare of the self and valued others. Moreover, many recent studies have either failed to replicate or exposed crucial confounds in the most cited evidence in support of sentimentalism. Moral psychologists should jettison sentimentalism, and focus instead on how considerations of harm and welfare—the core concepts of rationalist theories— interact with empirical beliefs to shape moral judgments.

摘要

过去几十年的道德心理学研究为道德判断的理性主义理论带来了经验异常。越来越多的心理学家和哲学家认为，情感异常可以很好地解释这些异常现象，即情感的存在对于形成真诚的道德判断是必要的。本评论揭示，尽管情感和道德判断的确经常同时发生，但很少有证据表明情感直接导致或构成道德判断。对厌恶，愤怒，同情和罪恶感的研究表明，人们只有在判断与自己的福祉相关的行为和珍视他人的行为时才能可靠地体验情绪。此外，最近的许多研究要么未能复制，要么在最常被引用的证据中揭示了关键的困惑，以支持情感主义。