An important question that is often raised, whether directly or indirectly, in philosophical discussions of shame‐inducing behavior concerns whether the experience of shame has unique moral value. Despite the fact that shame is strongly associated with negative affective responses, many people have argued that the experience of being ashamed plays an important motivating role, rather than being an obstacle, in living a moral life. These discussions, however, tend to take for granted two interrelated assumptions that I will be problematizing: 1) that the subject's shame is warranted; 2) that the shame is directly attributable to the subject's own actions. I challenge these assumptions by turning to a phenomenon I call secondhand shame, namely, shame that is induced by another person's shameless behavior. This essay examines the gender and racial dynamics that so frequently intensify secondhand shame, and suggests that this troubling phenomenon, when shared as a group experience, can be morally transformative, particularly when it leads to unified public resistance to shameless conduct.

中文翻译：

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无耻的耻辱

在有关羞耻行为的哲学讨论中，经常直接或间接提出一个重要问题，即羞耻经历是否具有独特的道德价值。尽管羞耻与负面情感反应密切相关，但许多人认为，羞愧经历在道德生活中起着重要的激励作用，而不是成为障碍。但是，这些讨论倾向于将我将要质疑的两个相互关联的假设视为理所当然：1）保证对象的羞耻是有道理的；2）羞耻直接归因于受试者自己的行为。通过转向一种我称为二手耻辱的现象，即由另一个人的无耻行为引起的耻辱，我挑战了这些假设。