Standard accounts of shame characterize it as an emotion of global negative self‐assessment, in which an individual necessarily accepts or assents to a global negative self‐evaluation. According to nonstandard accounts of shame, experiences of shame need not involve a global negative self‐assessment. I argue here in favor of nonstandard accounts of shame over standard accounts. First, I begin with a detailed discussion of standard accounts of shame, focusing primarily on Gabriele Taylor's standard account (Taylor 1985). Second, I illustrate how Adrian Piper's experience of groundless shame can be portrayed as 1) both a rational and an irrational experience of shame, in accordance with Taylor's account as a paradigm model of standard accounts of shame, and 2) as a rational experience of shame when taken in its own right as a legitimate, rational account of shame (Piper 1992/1996). Third, without denying that some experiences of shame either are or can be irrational experiences of shame, I elucidate how standard accounts of shame can act as mechanisms of epistemic injustice, and in doing so can transmute the righteous indignation of the marginalized by recasting them as shameful experiences (that is, by recasting them as experiences of the righteous shame of the marginalized).

中文翻译：

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耻辱眼中的理性：通过情感的压迫和解放*

标准的羞耻描述将其描述为全球负面自我评估的一种情感，在这种情感中，个人必然会接受或同意全球负面自我评估。根据关于羞耻的非标准描述，羞耻经历无需涉及全球负面的自我评估。我在这里主张非标准的耻辱而不是标准的帐目。首先，我首先对耻辱标准帐户进行详细讨论，主要集中于Gabriele Taylor的标准帐户（Taylor 1985）。其次，我说明了如何将阿德里安·派珀（Adrian Piper）的无耻羞耻经验描述为：1）根据泰勒（Taylor）的羞耻标准账户范式模型，以及（2）作为当被视为合法者本身时感到羞耻，羞耻感的合理解释（Piper 1992/1996）。第三，我不否认某些耻辱经历是或可以说是非理性的耻辱经历，我阐明了标准的耻辱说明如何充当认识论不公正的机制，并且在这样做时可以通过将其重新铸成边缘化而改变边缘化群体的正义愤慨。可耻的经历（也就是说，将他们重铸为边缘人义无反顾的经历）。