We cannot rethink the ethical and political dimensions of memory—especially its role in constituting persons and identities—without rethinking the nature of memory itself. I first describe a traditional epistemological view of memory, according to which memory is a faculty for preserving knowledge of the past, and then juxtapose a relational theory of memory developed by Sue Campbell. The relational theory is represented in terms of a distinction between actions and achievements; this distinction enables us to both clarify and defend the shift from an epistemological to a political conception of memory. On the resulting view, accuracy, not truth, is the appropriate norm for evaluating memory, and remembering is no longer conceived as an interior process. In the penultimate section I confront an objection to a relational theory of memory—and to relational theories of cognition generally—and suggest a strategy of response.

中文翻译：

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使认识论者变得神经质：关系记忆和心理个人主义

我们不能在不重新思考记忆本身的本质的情况下，重新考虑记忆的伦理和政治层面，尤其是记忆在构成个人和身份方面的作用。我首先描述传统的记忆认识论观点，根据该观点记忆是保存过去知识的能力，然后将苏·坎贝尔（Sue Campbell）提出的记忆关系理论并列。关系理论以行动与成就之间的区别来表示。这种区别使我们既可以澄清也可以辩护从认识论到政治记忆的转变。从结果来看，准确性而不是真理是评估记忆的适当准则，而记忆不再被视为内部过程。