Abstract

With the increasingly serious pollution from the ships berthing at port and the emergence of low-carbon policies, shore power (SP) and low sulfur fuel oil (LSFO) have become effective means to reduce the emissions from ships berthing in the ports. In order to analyse two emission mitigation strategies, we establish a non-cooperative game model in a transport chain consisting of a terminal and two carriers who adopt SP or LSFO strategy and obtain the equilibrium results and pricing strategies under different conditions. We observe that, when the carbon price is lower than a threshold, both carriers will choose LSFO; otherwise, both carriers will adopt SP. However, if the two carriers cooperate to maximize their total profits, they will simultaneously choose LSFO when the carbon price is lower than another threshold or choose SP when the carbon price is higher than the threshold, which will maximize the total profits of the transport chain. If the carbon price is less than the threshold, the consumer surplus will be maximized when two carriers adopt LSFO, otherwise the consumer surplus will be maximized when two carriers use SP. If two carriers cooperate to maximize their total profits, this will maximize the entire transport chain’s profits and the consumer surplus. Finally, the validity of model is verified by taking Shenzhen Port as an example.

中文翻译：

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岸电与低硫燃料油：运输链中承运人和港口的定价策略

摘要

随着船舶靠港污染日益严重以及低碳政策的出现，岸电（SP）和低硫燃料油（LSFO）已成为减少靠港船舶排放的有效手段。为了分析两种减排策略，我们在一个由一个终端和两个采用SP或LSFO策略的承运人组成的运输链中建立了一个非合作博弈模型，得到了不同条件下的均衡结果和定价策略。我们观察到，当碳价格低于一个阈值时，两个运营商都会选择 LSFO；否则，两家运营商都将采用SP。但是，如果两家运营商合作以最大化其总利润，当碳价格低于另一个阈值时他们会同时选择LSFO，或者当碳价格高于阈值时选择SP，这将使运输链的总利润最大化。如果碳价格小于阈值，则当两个运营商采用 LSFO 时消费者剩余最大化，否则当两个运营商使用 SP 时消费者剩余最大化。如果两个承运人合作使他们的总利润最大化，这将使整个运输链的利润和消费者剩余最大化。最后，以深圳港为例，验证了模型的有效性。否则，当两个运营商使用 SP 时，消费者剩余将最大化。如果两个承运人合作使他们的总利润最大化，这将使整个运输链的利润和消费者剩余最大化。最后，以深圳港为例，验证了模型的有效性。否则，当两个运营商使用 SP 时，消费者剩余将最大化。如果两个承运人合作使他们的总利润最大化，这将使整个运输链的利润和消费者剩余最大化。最后，以深圳港为例，验证了模型的有效性。