This paper investigates the differential impact of positive and negative excessive managerial entrenchment on the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, CEO compensation, and firm performance. We measure the degree of managerial entrenchment using the E-index introduced by Bebchuk et al. (2009). Our findings suggest that an increase in excess CEO entrenchment reduces the likelihood of CEO turnover due to poor performance. We also show a positive association between excessive entrenchment and CEO compensation as managers gain more power and authority when they are entrenched. On the other hand, excess CEO entrenchment has an inverse correlation with firm performance and firm value. Overall, we propose that excessive managerial entrenchment has a converse impact on board monitoring and shareholders’ welfare.

本文研究了正向和负向过度管理者根深蒂固对首席执行官离职绩效敏感度，首席执行官薪酬和公司绩效的不同影响。我们使用Bebchuk等人引入的E指数来衡量管理者的固守程度。（2009）。我们的研究结果表明，过多的首席执行官纠缠不休会降低由于业绩不佳而导致的CEO离职的可能性。我们还显示，过度管理和首席执行官的薪酬之间存在正相关关系，因为经理人在获得根深蒂固的权力后会获得更多权力和权威。另一方面，过多的CEO纠缠与公司绩效和公司价值成反比。总体而言，我们建议过度的管理人员纠缠对董事会的监督和股东福利产生相反的影响。