This paper uses multi-country, firm-level data covering 109 countries for the period 2005 to 2017, to examine the effects of bribery on export decisions for firms facing institutional constraints. Bribery consists of “greasing” and rent-seeking behavior. Firms’ self-evaluations of the extent of obstacles affecting their business operations, including corruption, political instability, tax administration, and business license regulations, were used to capture the institutional constraints. Our empirical results provide evidence to support the “greasing-the-wheels-of-trade” hypothesis. The positive effect of greasing bribery is particularly sizable for large-sized firms or those facing no institutional constraints. In other words, firms with strong bargaining power proxied by firm size obtain more benefits from paying bribes if there are no institutional constraints; thus, they are more likely to export. These results hold when we specify almost all types of institutional constraints except for political instability. Lastly, when the endogeneity problem is controlled, the effect of greasing bribery becomes pronounced.

本文使用涵盖2005年至2017年期间109个国家/地区的多国公司级数据，研究了贿赂对面临制度约束的公司的出口决策的影响。贿赂包括“加油”和寻租行为。公司对影响其业务运营的障碍程度（包括腐败，政治不稳定，税收管理和营业执照法规）进行了自我评估，以此来捕捉制度上的约束。我们的经验结果提供了证据来支持“贸易增长的轮子”假说。对于大型公司或没有机构限制的公司，增加贿赂的积极作用尤其重要。换一种说法，如果没有机构限制，具有强大议价能力的公司可以通过行贿获得更多利益；因此，它们更有可能出口。当我们指定除政治不稳定以外的几乎所有类型的制度约束时，这些结果成立。最后，当控制了内生性问题时，增加贿赂的效果就很明显。