Thermal infrared detection systems play an important role in many areas such as night security, autonomous driving, and body temperature detection. They have the unique advantages of passive imaging, temperature sensitivity and penetration. But the security of these systems themselves has not been fully explored, which poses risks in applying these systems. We propose a physical attack method with small bulbs on a board against the state of-the-art pedestrian detectors. Our goal is to make infrared pedestrian detectors unable to detect real-world pedestrians. Towards this goal, we first showed that it is possible to use two kinds of patches to attack the infrared pedestrian detector based on YOLOv3. The average precision (AP) dropped by 64.12% in the digital world, while a blank board with the same size caused the AP to drop by 29.69% only. After that, we designed and manufactured a physical board and successfully attacked YOLOv3 in the real world. In recorded videos, the physical board caused AP of the target detector to drop by 34.48%, while a blank board with the same size caused the AP to drop by 14.91% only. With the ensemble attack techniques, the designed physical board had good transferability to unseen detectors.

中文翻译：

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使用小灯泡在现实世界中欺骗热红外行人探测器

红外热探测系统在许多领域中发挥着重要作用，例如夜间安全，自动驾驶和体温检测。它们具有被动成像，温度敏感性和穿透性的独特优势。但是这些系统本身的安全性尚未得到充分探讨，这在应用这些系统时会带来风险。我们提出了一种针对木板上的小灯泡的物理攻击方法，以应对最新的行人探测器。我们的目标是使红外行人检测器无法检测现实世界中的行人。为了实现这一目标，我们首先表明可以使用两种补丁来攻击基于YOLOv3的红外行人检测器。在数字世界中，平均精度（AP）下降了64.12％，而具有相同尺寸的空白板导致AP仅下降了29.69％。之后，我们设计并制造了一块物理板，并成功地攻击了现实世界中的YOLOv3。在录制的视频中，物理板导致目标检测器的AP下降34.48％，而具有相同尺寸的空白板导致AP的下降仅14.91％。利用整体攻击技术，设计的物理板可以很好地转移到看不见的探测器。