Policymakers seeking to raise more tax revenues from multinational enterprises have two alternatives: to raise tax rates or to devote more resources to improve tax compliance. Tougher tax enforcement increases the cost of profit shifting, and thus mitigates tax competition. We present a tax‐competition model with two policy instruments (the corporate tax rate and the tightness of tax enforcement). In line with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project, we analyze the scope for enforcement cooperation among asymmetric countries, considering that taxes are set noncooperatively. We show that the low‐tax country may fail to cooperate if asymmetry is large enough and that tax havens would never agree to cooperate. Then we identify two drivers for enforcement cooperation. The first driver of cooperation is the complementarity of enforcement actions across countries. This is because the efficiency loss from enforcement dispersion is greater under complementarity. The second driver of cooperation is tax leadership by the high‐tax country, which acts as a level‐playing field in the tax competition and reduces the extent of disagreement on enforcement.

中文翻译：

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向跨国公司征税：执法合作的范围

寻求从跨国企业增加税收的政策制定者有两种选择：提高税率或投入更多资源以改善税收合规性。严格的税收执法增加了利润转移的成本，从而减轻了税收竞争。我们提出了一种具有两种政策工具的税收竞争模型（公司税率和税收执行的严格性）。根据经济合作与发展组织的基本侵蚀和利润转移项目，我们考虑到税收是非合作性地设定的，因此分析了不对称国家之间执法合作的范围。我们证明，如果不对称程度足够大，低税率国家可能无法合作，避税天堂也永远不会同意合作。然后，我们确定了执法合作的两个推动力。合作的第一推动力是各国执法行动的互补性。这是因为在互补性下，执法分散带来的效率损失更大。合作的第二个推动力是高税率国家的税收领导，它在税收竞争中扮演着公平竞争的角色，并减少了对执法的分歧程度。