We study the problem of stochastic stability for evolutionary dynamics under the logit choice rule. We consider general classes of coordination games, symmetric or asymmetric, with an arbitrary number of strategies, which satisfies the marginal bandwagon property (i.e., there is positive feedback to coordinate). Our main result is that the most likely evolutionary escape paths from a status quo convention consist of a series of identical mistakes. As an application of our result, we show that the Nash bargaining solution arises as the long run convention for the evolutionary Nash demand game under the usual logit choice rule. We also obtain a new bargaining solution if the logit choice rule is combined with intentional idiosyncratic plays. The new bargaining solution is more egalitarian than the Nash bargaining solution, demonstrating that intentionality implies equality under the logit choice model.

我们研究了对数选择规则下演化动力学的随机稳定性问题。我们考虑具有任意数量策略的对称或不对称协调游戏的一般类别，它们满足边际潮流的属性（即，存在积极的反馈要进行协调）。我们的主要结果是，从现状惯例出发，最可能的进化逃逸路径包括一系列相同的错误。作为我们结果的应用，我们证明了Nash讨价还价解决方案的出现是在常规logit选择规则下进化Nash需求博弈的长期惯例。如果将logit选择规则与故意特质游戏结合起来，我们还将获得新的议价解决方案。新的议价解决方案比纳什议价解决方案更加平等