In recent work on the semantics of definite descriptions, some theorists (Elbourne in Definite descriptions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013 ; Schoubye in Noûs 47(3):496–533, 2013 ) have advocated broadly Fregean accounts, whereby a definite description ‘the F ’ introduces a presupposition to the effect that there is exactly one F and refers to it if there is, while other theorists (Abbott, in: Gundel, Hedberg (eds) Reference: Interdisciplinary perspectives, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 61–72, 2008 ; Hawthorne and Manley in The reference book, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012 ) have advocated accounts whereby ‘the F ’ introduces a presupposition to the effect that there is exactly one F but otherwise has the semantics of ‘an F ’, introducing existential quantification. It is argued that the latter theories, since they have definite descriptions encode assertoric content to the effect that there is an F , have difficulty accounting for the felicity of ‘The F is G ’ when it is already presupposed that there is an F .

中文翻译：

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预设、断言和明确的描述

在最近关于确定描述语义的工作中，一些理论家（Elbourne in Definite descriptions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013 ; Schoubye in Noûs 47(3):496–533, 2013 ）广泛提倡弗雷格式的描述，即确定的描述'the F ' 引入了一个假设，即存在正好有一个 F 并在存在时引用它，而其他理论家 (Abbott, in: Gundel, Hedberg (eds) 参考：跨学科观点，牛津大学出版社，牛津，pp . 61–72, 2008 ; Hawthorne 和 Manley 在参考书，牛津大学出版社，牛津，2012 年）提倡这样的说法，即“F”引入了一个假设，即确实存在一个 F，但在其他方面具有“的语义”一个 F '，引入存在量化。有人认为，后一种理论，