Cyber-physical attacks impose a significant threat to the smart grid, as the cyber attack makes it difficult to identify the actual damage caused by the physical attack. To defend against such attacks, various inference-based solutions have been proposed to estimate the states of grid elements (e.g., transmission lines) from measurements outside the attacked area, out of which a few have provided theoretical conditions for guaranteed accuracy. However, these conditions are usually based on the ground truth states and thus not verifiable in practice. To solve this problem, we develop (i) verifiable conditions that can be tested based on only observable information, and (ii) efficient algorithms for verifying the states of links (i.e., transmission lines) within the attacked area based on these conditions. Our numerical evaluations based on the Polish power grid and IEEE 300-bus system demonstrate that the proposed algorithms are highly successful in verifying the states of truly failed links, and can thus greatly help in prioritizing repairs during the recovery process.

中文翻译：

---

网络物理攻击下可验证的智能电网故障定位

网络物理攻击对智能电网构成了重大威胁，因为网络攻击使其难以识别物理攻击造成的实际损害。为了防御这种攻击，已经提出了各种基于推理的解决方案，以根据受攻击区域之外的测量结果来估计网格元素（例如，传输线）的状态，其中一些已经为保证精度提供了理论条件。但是，这些条件通常基于基本事实状态，因此在实践中无法验证。为了解决这个问题，我们开发了（i）仅基于可观察信息就可以测试的可验证条件，以及（ii）基于这些条件来验证受攻击区域内的链路（即传输线）状态的有效算法。