Contract farming can be an effective measure to deal with agricultural production risks. This study provides a two‐stage stochastic programming model to analyze farmers’ cooperation in the context of contract farming under uncertainty. It provides a fair cost allocation policy for a coalition of farmers using a stochastic linear duality approach. A fair cost allocation implies that no subset of farmers has an incentive to leave the coalition. Thus, a fair allocation policy ensures the stability of a coalition. Meanwhile, the risk pooling game is shown to have population monotonicity, which means that, every time a coalition adds a new member, each farmer within the coalition will incur a smaller cost. Hence, the population monotonicity gives an incentive for coalition expansion. Our results not only provide a simple way to design fair cost allocation policies for collaboration strategies in contract farming, but also play an important role in the sustainable development of farmers’ coalitions.

中文翻译：

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合同农业中的风险分担合作博弈

合同农业可以作为应对农业生产风险的有效措施。这项研究提供了一个两阶段的随机规划模型，用于分析不确定性情况下的合同农业下的农民合作。它使用随机线性对偶方法为农民联盟提供了公平的成本分配政策。合理的成本分配意味着没有一部分农民有动力离开联盟。因此，公平的分配政策可确保联盟的稳定性。同时，风险分担博弈被证明具有人口单调性，这意味着，每当联盟增加一个新成员时，联盟中的每个农民将产生较小的成本。因此，人口的单调性为联盟扩张提供了动力。