When faced with a dilemma between believing what is supported by an impartial assessment of the evidence (e.g., that one's friend is guilty of a crime) and believing what would better fulfill a moral obligation (e.g., that the friend is innocent), people often believe in line with the latter. But is this how people think beliefs ought to be formed? We addressed this question across three studies and found that, across a diverse set of everyday situations, people treat moral considerations as legitimate grounds for believing propositions that are unsupported by objective, evidence-based reasoning. We further document two ways in which moral considerations affect how people evaluate others' beliefs. First, the moral value of a belief affects the evidential threshold required to believe, such that morally beneficial beliefs demand less evidence than morally risky beliefs. Second, people sometimes treat the moral value of a belief as an independent justification for belief, and on that basis, sometimes prescribe evidentially poor beliefs to others. Together these results show that, in the folk ethics of belief, morality can justify and demand motivated reasoning.

当面临两难之间的困境时，人们通常会认为在公正评估证据的基础上（例如，某人的朋友犯了罪）和相信哪些东西能够更好地履行道德义务（例如，该朋友是无辜的）。相信与后者一致。但这是人们认为应该形成信念的方式吗？我们通过三项研究解决了这个问题，发现在各种各样的日常情况中，人们将道德考虑作为相信不受客观，基于证据的推理支持的主张的合法依据。我们进一步记录了道德考量影响人们如何评价他人信仰的两种方式。首先，信仰的道德价值会影响信仰所需的证据标准，这样，在道德上有利的信念所需要的证据少于在道德上具有风险的信念。其次，人们有时将信仰的道德价值视为信仰的独立理由，并在此基础上有时将明显较差的信仰开给他人。这些结果加在一起表明，在信仰的民间伦理中，道德可以证明并要求有动机的推理。