According to David Miller, immigration is not a human right. Conversely, Kieran Oberman makes a case for immigration as a human right. We agree with the latter view, but we show that its starting point is mistaken. Indeed, both Miller and Oberman discuss the right to immigration within the liberal paradigm: it is a right or not depending on the correct balance between the interests of the citizens of a given national state and the interests of the immigrants. Instead, we claim that public justification can underpin immigration as a human right. That said, the public justification of the right to immigration has several counterarguments to rebut. Before we deal with that issue, relying on Jürgen Habermas’s social theory, we examine the legal structures that could support the right to immigration in practice. To be sure, this does not provide the normative justification needed, instead it shows the framework that allows the institutional realization of this right. Then, through a combination of civic and cosmopolitan forms of solidarity, the article discusses the formation of a public sphere, which could provide the justification of the right to immigration.

根据大卫·米勒（David Miller）的说法，移民不是人权。相反，基兰·奥伯曼（Kieran Oberman）提出了将移民作为人权的理由。我们同意后一种观点，但我们表明其出发点是错误的。的确，米勒和奥伯曼都在自由主义范式中讨论了移民权：是一项权利与否，取决于给定民族国家公民的利益与移民利益之间的正确平衡。取而代之的是，我们声称公共辩护可以支撑移民作为一项人权。话虽如此，移民权利的公开理由有许多反驳。在我们处理这个问题之前，我们先根据哈根马斯（JürgenHabermas）的社会理论，研究可以在实践中支持移民权的法律结构。为了确定，这没有提供所需的规范依据，而是显示了允许该权利的制度化实现的框架。然后，通过结合公民和世界主义形式的团结，文章讨论了公共领域的形成，这可以为移民权提供依据。