We examine how analogy-based collective decision-making of member states contributes to the endogenous emergence of informal rules and the incremental change of international organizations (IOs). Decision-making by analogy is an important characteristic of day-to-day decision-making in IOs. Relating current decisions to previous ones through analogies drives incremental change and simultaneously reinforces organizational resilience. Whereas the foreign policy analysis literature shows that analogies can be used as cognitive shortcuts in fuzzy and complex foreign policy situations, we focus on their use to overcome social ambiguity (indeterminacy) of coordination situations in IOs. Drawing on psychological conceptions, we develop two micro-level mechanisms that elucidate the effects of analogy-based collective decision-making in member-driven IOs. Analogy-based collective decisions emphasizing similarity between a current situation and previous ones follow an established problem schema and produce expansive and increasingly well-established informal rules. Collective decisions that are analogy-based but emphasize a crucial difference follow different problem schemas and trigger the emergence of additional informal rules that apply to new classes of cases. The result is an increasingly fine-grained web of distinct organizational solutions for a growing number of problems. Accordingly, an IO can increasingly facilitate collective decision-making and gains resilience. Empirically, we probe these propositions with a documentary analysis of decision-making in the Yugoslavia sanctions committee, established by the United Nations Security Council to deal with a stream of requests for exempting certain goods or services from the comprehensive economic embargo imposed on Yugoslavia in response to the War in the Balkans.

我们研究了基于类比的成员国集体决策如何促进非正式规则的内生性出现和国际组织（IOs）的不断变化。类比决策是IO中日常决策的重要特征。通过类比将当前决策与以前的决策联系起来，可以推动增量更改，同时增强组织的弹性。外交政策分析文献显示，类比可以用作模糊和复杂外交政策情况下的认知捷径，而我们重点关注类推方法来克服IO中协调情况的社会歧义（不确定性）。利用心理概念，我们开发了两种微观机制，阐明了成员驱动的IO中基于类比的集体决策的影响。基于类比​​的集体决策强调了当前情况与先前情况之间的相似性，遵循了既定的问题方案，并产生了广泛且日益完善的非正式规则。基于类比​​但强调关键差异的集体决策遵循不同的问题方案，并触发了适用于新类别案件的其他非正式规则的出现。结果是针对越来越多的问题，越来越细粒度的独特组织解决方案网络。因此，IO可以越来越多地促进集体决策并获得弹性。根据经验，我们通过对南斯拉夫制裁委员会决策的书面分析来探讨这些主张，