Little evidence exists on whether and why organizations comply with regulations that are not monitored or enforced. To address that shortage, this study evaluates the 2007 repeal of an essentially unenforced regulation mandating private and local government employers in Sweden to post their vacancies publicly at the Public Employment Service. Exploiting the fact that central government employers were not affected, difference-in-differences analyses identify a substantial negative effect of the repeal on local government employers' vacancy posting propensity – with similar results for the private sector. At odds with deterrence models of regulatory compliance, these findings hint at an important role for organizational factors related to cultures and norms. Heterogeneity analyses indicate that local governments with more law-abiding organizational culture and stronger social responsibility commitment were more prone to comply with the unenforced regulation. The results thus simultaneously point to an untapped potential and to some possible preconditions for unenforced regulatory strategies.

中文翻译：

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当纸老虎咬人时：瑞典雇主遵守非强制监管的证据

关于组织是否以及为什么遵守不受监控或执行的法规的证据很少。为了解决这一短缺问题，本研究评估了 2007 年废除一项基本上未强制执行的规定，该规定要求瑞典的私人和地方政府雇主在公共就业服务处公开发布其职位空缺。利用中央政府雇主不受影响的事实，差异分析确定了废除对地方政府雇主的职位空缺发布倾向的重大负面影响——私营部门的结果相似。与监管合规的威慑模型不一致，这些发现暗示了与文化和规范相关的组织因素的重要作用。异质性分析表明，具有更多守法组织文化和更强社会责任承诺的地方政府更容易遵守非强制监管。因此，结果同时指出了未开发的潜力以及未强制执行的监管策略的一些可能的先决条件。