Abstract

In this article, I broadly consider the constitutionalisation of the common law of personality from the perspective of the South African transformative constitutionalism paradigm. This interrogation is the result of the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Le Roux v Dey, which provides an ostensible alignment between the common law and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 in respect of the human personality. In this regard, I critique this judgment and show how it creates doctrinal, ideological, substantive and methodological barriers when one considers the common law’s actual constitutionalisation. These critiques follow from my argument that the constitutionalisation of the common law of personality ought to take place in terms of its doctrine, its underpinning ideology and resultant substance and method with reference to the overarching transformative paradigm. I argue that the constitutionalisation of the common law of personality should be revisited in terms of these considerations. At the end of this article, I attempt to demonstrate how these doctrinal, ideological and structural considerations ought to be addressed in mapping the way forward for the actual constitutionalisation of the common law of personality.

抽象的

在本文中，我从南非变革型宪政主义范式的角度广泛考虑人格普通法的宪法化。审讯是宪法法院在勒鲁克斯诉戴伊案中作出判决的结果，从表面上看，普通法与1996年《南非共和国宪法》在人格方面具有明显的一致性。在这方面，我批评这一判断，并说明当人们考虑普通法的实际宪法化时，它如何在理论，思想，实质和方法上设置障碍。这些批评源于我的论点，即人格普通法的宪法化应在其学说，其基础意识形态以及由此而来的实质和方法方面参照总体变革范式进行。我认为，应从这些考虑因素重新审视人格普通法的宪法化。在本文的最后，我试图证明这些理论，