Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology and epistemology of visual perception.

中文翻译：

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我们看到事实了吗？

感知哲学家经常假设我们看到的是实际的事态或事实。把这种说法称为事实主义。在他的书中，William Fish 建议事实主义得到了现象学观察以及多目标跟踪和动态特征-目标集成的实验研究的支持。在本文中，我检查了所谓的事实主义证据，主要关注对象检测和跟踪。我认为没有科学证据支持事实主义。这一结论对视觉感知的现象学和认识论的研究具有启示意义。