This paper analyses the choice of managers' types in a vertical structure with a common input supplier. Depending on the degree of product differentiation, the choice of either an overconfident or an underconfident manager can arise whatever the downstream competition mode. In addition, when competition is in quantities, the well‐known prisoner's dilemma result of strategic delegation does not apply when owners optimally delegate to underconfident managers. Instead, under price competition, a prisoner's dilemma applies but only when the strategic decision is optimally delegated to overconfident managers. Relative to the endogenous market structure, a novel outcome with multiple asymmetric equilibria arises when the degree of product differentiation is low. Introducing multiple upstream suppliers confirms the importance of taking the structure of upstream markets into account in assessing the strategic choices by downstream firms.

中文翻译：

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垂直相关市场的偏向经理

本文分析了具有共同输入供应商的纵向结构中经理人员类型的选择。根据产品差异化程度的不同，无论下游竞争模式如何，都可能会选择过度自信的经理或缺乏自信的经理。此外，在竞争激烈的情况下，当所有者以最佳方式委派给自信不足的管理者时，战略委派的众所周知的囚徒困境结果就不适用。相反，在价格竞争中，只有在将战略决策最佳地委派给过分自信的管理人员的情况下，囚犯的困境才适用。相对于内源性市场结构，当产品差异化程度较低时，会出现具有多个不对称均衡的新结果。