What incentives do governments have to negotiate trade agreements that constrain their domestic regulatory policies? We study a model in which firms design products to appeal to local consumer tastes, but their fixed costs increase with the difference between versions of their product destined for different markets. In this setting, firms' profit‐maximizing choices of product attributes are globally optimal in the absence of consumption externalities, but national governments have unilateral incentives to invoke regulatory protectionism to induce firm delocation. An efficient trade agreement requires commitments not to engage in such opportunistic behavior. A rule requiring mutual recognition of standards can be used to achieve efficiency, but one that requires only national treatment falls short. When product attributes confer local consumption externalities, an efficient trade agreement must coordinate the fine details of countries' regulatory policies.

中文翻译：

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贸易协定的“新”经济学：从贸易自由化到监管趋同？

政府必须采取哪些激励措施来谈判限制其国内监管政策的贸易协定？我们研究了一种模型，在这种模型中，公司设计产品以吸引当地消费者的口味，但是其固定成本会随着针对不同市场的产品版本之间的差异而增加。在这种情况下，在没有消费外部性的情况下，企业的利润最大化的产品属性选择在全球范围内是最优的，但是各国政府有单方面的动机来援引监管保护主义来诱使企业流离失所。有效的贸易协议要求做出不参与这种机会主义行为的承诺。可以使用需要相互承认标准的规则来实现效率，但是仅需要国民待遇的规则就达不到要求。