We use data from Hungary to establish two results about the relationship between the government and the media. (i) We document large advertising favors from the government to connected media, and large corruption coverage favors from connected media to the government. Our empirical strategy exploits sharp reallocations around changes in media ownership and other events to rule out market‐based explanations. (ii) Under the assumptions of a structural model, we distinguish between owner ideology and favor exchange as the mechanism driving favors. We estimate our model exploiting within‐owner changes in coverage for identification and find that both mechanisms are important. These results imply that targeted government advertising can meaningfully influence content. Counterfactuals show that targeted advertising can also influence owner ideology, by making media ownership more profitable to pro‐government connected investors. Our results are consistent with qualitative evidence from many democracies and suggest that government advertising affects media content worldwide.

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我们使用来自匈牙利的数据来建立有关政府与媒体之间关系的两个结果。（i）我们记录了从政府到关联媒体的大量广告支持，以及从关联媒体到政府的大量腐败报道。我们的经验策略利用围绕媒体所有权变化和其他事件的敏锐再分配来排除基于市场的解释。（ii）在结构模型的假设下，我们区分所有者意识形态和利益交换作为推动利益的机制。我们通过利用覆盖范围内的内部变化进行识别来估计我们的模型，发现这两种机制都很重要。这些结果表明，有针对性的政府广告可以有意义地影响内容。反事实表明，定向广告也可以影响所有者的意识形态，通过使媒体所有权对亲政府的投资者更加有利可图。我们的结果与许多民主国家的定性证据一致，并表明政府广告会影响全球的媒体内容。