We theoretically and experimentally study the evolution of strategies reflecting different moral judgments under indirect reciprocity. We fully characterize the asymptotically stable sets of rest points. In all cooperative rest points multiple strategies coexist. This offers an explanation for the heterogeneity in moral judgments among humans. The behavior prescribed by the predicted strategies can rationalize the design of real-life reputation systems, which are set up to resolve problems of moral hazard. In our laboratory experiment, we find that more than 75% of participants play strategies that belong to the predicted set of strategies.

中文翻译：

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间接互惠下的道德进化

我们在理论上和实验上研究了间接互惠下反映不同道德判断的策略的演变。我们充分刻画了渐近稳定的静止点集。在所有合作休息点中，多种策略共存。这解释了人类道德判断的异质性。预测策略所规定的行为可以使现实生活中的声誉系统的设计合理化，该系统旨在解决道德风险问题。在我们的实验室实验中，我们发现超过75％的参与者玩的策略属于预测的策略集。